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1Abstract
By exploiting a new rich rm{level dataset, this paper investigates the de-
cision to subcontract production activities (outsourcing) with respect to ver-
tically integrate them. In particular, we aim at identifying the main factors
underlying the decision to either fully or partially decentralise production ac-
tivities by mechanical rms located in Emilia Romagna (Italy). In so doing,
we rst account for rm characteristics, such as size, age and the skill compo-
sition of the labour force, then we focus on labour costs per employee, product
diversity and the presence of the rm on international markets. Finally, and
dierently from previous research, we include in the analysis both the qualita-
tive composition of the production process, as given by the stages of produc-
tion potentially developed by the rm, and the industrial composition of the
local market. On this last purpose, we estimate the relationship between the
propensity and the intensity of concurrent and total sourcing and the main
sources of agglomeration economies identied in the literature: specialisation
economies, variety and urbanisation economies. Our estimates show a partic-
ularly strong and positive relation between the intensity of 'pure' outsourcing
and our measure of variety, workforce skill intensity and the internal composi-
tion of production, while a negative relation emerges with respect to rm size,
age and labour cost. Results concerning concurrent sourcing, instead, appear
weaker, but, dierently from the case of full outsourcing, we nd a positive
relationship with rm size and product diversity.
21 Introduction
The topic of making or buying is at the core of any theory of the rm as
it contributes to the denition of the boundaries of the rm (Coase, 1937).
According to transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975), the choice be-
tween producing internally or through outsourcing on the market is based on
a cost-benet analysis, in which benets basically arise in terms of production
cost savings, while costs primarily concern the costs of writing and enforcing
contracts with suppliers. These latter are particularly relevant since they in-
volve hold up problems, which, in turn, depend on asset specicity and on the
uncertainty of transactions.
Other forms of benets and costs of outsourcing versus vertical integration
emerge from other theories of the rm (Gulati and Puranam, 2006; Parmi-
giani, 2007; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009). Some works related to neoclas-
sical economics (Adelman, 1949; Porter, 1980; Abraham and Taylor, 1996),
for instance, point to the positive eect of outsourcing in terms of reducing
the volatility of market demand or of increasing the 
exibility of the rm in
smoothing the workload during peak periods, or in terms of the ability to keep
track of technological change in production in order to take a higher control
over suppliers. The resources and competencies theory of the rm (Teece,
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997), instead, emphasises the role of outsourcing in deal-
ing with technological uncertainty and in allowing access to external expertise
vis-a-vis the risk of transferring part of the knowledge base of the rm to
suppliers.
Other factors related to the decision to make or buy can be also identi-
ed in Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini (2007a,b): union density (Abraham and
Taylor, 1996), industrial relations (Benson and Ieronimo, 1996), R&D inten-
sity (Tomiura, 2005) as well as investments in information and communication
technologies (Abramovsky and Grith, 2006), output heterogeneity and geo-
graphical dispersion, or, nally, the intangible nature of the assets used by the
rm in storing the knowledge required to manage transactions (Gonzalez-Diaz,
Arru~ nada, and Fernandez, 2000).
The factors just mentioned not only aect the decision to fully contract out
production or service activities, but they also apply to one important aspect
which has often been neglected in the empirical literature, namely concurrent
sourcing, i.e. rms jointly making and subcontracting the same activity (Gulati
and Puranam, 2006; Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009). In this
case, the decision to concurrently source production to external suppliers seems
to be still driven by demand uncertainty, the need to better monitor suppliers,
the possibility to share cost and learning opportunities among buyers and
suppliers, the degree of complementarity among production technologies and
3the sharing of interrm expertise.
In the present work we focus the attention on two aspects that have been
scantily investigated in the literature. First, we study if both the decision and
the intensity of outsourcing are related to rm-specic characteristics, like size,
age, product complexity and qualitative composition of the production process.
Secondly, we focus on the industrial composition surrounding the outsourcing
rms, and we try to see if such a business strategy can be related to the main
sources of agglomeration economies at the local level, namely specialisation
versus variety-based economies.
The choice of a suitable statistical instrument to investigate the rms'
outsourcing behaviour has been driven by the nature of our outcome variable,
i.e. the number of phases totally or partially outsourced. As this variable
represent the (discrete) number of occurrence of an event, we decide to adopt
a count regression model. In this framework, the excess of zeros characterising
the outcome variable leads us to select the Zero In
ated Negative Binomial
that allows us to jointly model the decision to outsource (i.e. a "yes/no"
variable) and the incidence of the number of phases contracted out by the rm
with respect to the total number of the performed phases.
In so doing, we exploit a unique dataset which collects a large number
of information on mechanical rms located in the Emilia Romagna region of
Italy in year 2005. For each rm, a detailed set of information is available both
on the type of production activities operated and on the way these activities
are developed. Moreover, we calculate our spatial agglomeration variables
by merging these information with census data at the level of Local Labour
System (LLS) coming from the Italian Statistical Institute.
Our data concern only one region, Emilia Romagna and one industry, me-
chanics. This region is an interesting example of recovery and sustained growth
since the post-war period, both in terms of employment and productivity. Par-
ticularly after the Second World War, \a wide range of new sectors emerged
out of [its] pervasive and generic knowledge base one after the other. As such,
these new applications made the regional economy to diversify into new di-
rections. Examples are sectors like the packaging industry, the ceramic tiles
sector, luxury car manufacturers (Maserati, Ferrari,among others), robotics,
agricultural machinery, among other sectors. These new sectors not only built
and expanded on this regional knowledge base, they also renewed and extended
it, further broadening the economy of Emilia Romagna" (Asheim, Boschma,
and Cooke, 2009, p. 6, emphasis added). In addition, Emilia Romagna also
represents a dense basin of industrial district areas, as it is part of the so{called
Third Italy (Brusco, 1982; Becattini, 1990). This fact allow us to devote a par-
ticular attention to the role played by spatial agglomeration, as rms typically
locate in these areas in order to benet from knowledge spillovers coming from
4the geographical and social proximity to other rms. In this sense, outsourcing
is a strategy that can both aect and can be aected by the actual industrial
composition of the region.
The relevance of the industry under examination, i.e. mechanics, is due to
the fact that it represents one of the most dynamic specialisations not only
for the Italian manufacturing system as a whole, but, in particular, for the
manufacturing system of Emilia Romagna and its industrial districts.1 Recent
studies, in particular, show that, in the 1981-2001 period, while the mechanical
employment at the national level has decreased, the mechanical employment
in the North-East of Italy has increased, particularly in the Provinces of the
Emilia Romagna region located along the so{called via Emilia (Russo and
Pirani, 2006; Russo, Pirani, and Paterlini, 2006).
The main novelties of this paper are three. First, our data allow us to
provide information not only on the decision to outsource, but also on the
intensity of outsourcing, as given by the share of production stages contracted
out by each single rm. We also examine the decision, and relative intensity,
to partially subcontract production activities. Second, we exploit the detailed
information on the phases actually operated by each rm in order to expand the
set of rm-specic characteristics that can aect the outsourcing decision and
intensity. Third, we also provide some results on the link between outsourcing
and the local environment in which rms operate. Moreover, the nature of
the data and the context we investigate also allow us to focus on small and
medium rms, rather than on large business companies.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 brie
y reviews the recent
literature about the determinants of outsourcing and concurrent sourcing. In
particular, we look at works analysing the role of rm characteristics and of
the scale of the local context surrounding the outsourcing rms. Section 3
describes the data we use in the empirical analysis, which represent a new
source of information on rms' activities. Section 4 presents the methodology
adopted for the econometric exercise. Section 5 shows the estimation results
on the propensity to totally or partially outsource and on the intensity of
outsourcing. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
When dealing with the identication of rm boundaries, transaction costs eco-
nomics (TCE) can be considered as the dominant approach. In this theory,
1Actually, the mechanical sector in Emilia Romagna has to be seen rather as a meta{
district, as it covers several areas (Province) and dierent sub{specialisations.
5rms solve the problem of whether to produce internally or externally by com-
paring the costs associated to the two distinct governance structures, i.e. a
vertically integrated and a 'disintegrated' one. Factors that are supposed to
aect such a decision are the degree of asset specicity, the level of uncertainty
and the frequency of transactions (Williamson, 1975). In particular, a high
level of volume and performance uncertainty, associated to a relatively high
level of asset specicity, is supposed to drive the rm to integrate production
in order to minimise risks and exploit a higher level of internal co-ordination.
However, at least other two strands of the economic literature can be con-
sidered when dealing with outsourcing and concurrent sourcing, i.e. neoclas-
sical economics and the rm capabilities approach. For instance, in contrast
with TCE, the former (Adelman, 1949; Porter, 1980; Abraham and Taylor,
1996) predicts that higher volume and performance uncertainty lead the rm
to outsource production activities in order to keep the production cycle as sta-
ble as possible over time, i.e. for 
exibility in meeting demand, or in order to
enhance its understanding of the core production activities. On the contrary,
the desire to exploit the potential for internal scope economies may induce the
rm to integrate production activities, the opposite being true in presence of
scope economies for suppliers: in this case, the possibility to face lower prices
may lead the rm to contract out the production of goods and services. Finally,
the desire to reduce production costs and to get access to lacking, otherwise
specialised, skills can also induce the rm to outsource production.
Concurrent sourcing, instead, is a governance choice that, according to
TCE, rms select in presence of a moderate level of volume and performance
uncertainty, whereas, according to neoclassical economics, the opposite is true,
as rms select concurrent sourcing when facing higher volumes, performance
uncertainty, and greater scope economies for both the rm and its suppliers.
Finally, the capability view of the rm (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997)
stresses the level of expertise of both the rm and its suppliers | as well as a
high level of technological uncertainty and a higher possibility to increase the
number of knowledge sources from external suppliers | as the main determi-
nants of concurrent sourcing.
Moreover, while the previous theories put the emphasis on the character-
istics of transactions, of the market, and of rms involved in the make-or-buy
choice respectively, we here stress two other sets of variables as being poten-
tially involved in dening the boundaries of the rm: (i) the technology of
the production process, i.e. its qualitative composition and the diversity of
production oerings, as part of a broader set of rm-specic characteristics,
and (ii) the industrial composition of the LLS where the rm is located. In
particular, we rst ask if, along with other relevant rm characteristics like
size, age and skill intensity, there are certain types of activities that are, by
6nature or by design, more prone to be partially/totally outsourced or oper-
ated in-house than others: secondly, we ask if outsourcing is related with the
structural composition of the local context in which rms operate.
With respect to the former issue, few works have empirically studied the
relationship between production complexity and the make or buy decision.
This relationship has been rst investigated in a transaction cost economics
approach (Masten, 1984), in which product complexity is conceived in terms of
product diversity, namely the number of dierent products that a rm is able
to oer in the market. In general, the relationship between outsourcing and
complexity has a negative sign: greater product diversity is supposed to in-
crease the complexity of contractual arrangements, thus increasing transaction
costs and reducing the propensity to outsource.
However, the sign of the relationship may depend on the size of the rm:
looking at US credit unions nancial activities over a decade, Ono and Stango
(2005) nd, for instance, that greater product complexity is associated with
more outsourcing in the case of small and medium rms, whereas for larger
rms this relationship turns to be negative. This positive relationship may be
explained by the will of small rms to reduce xed costs in production and to
exploit suppliers' superior expertise, while not having sucient internal scale
economies for handling complex phases of production.
A greater product variety is also associated to increasing economies of scope
that can reduce the cost of current activities when rms gain eciency through
the joint co-ordination of multiple activities. In this respect, Parmigiani and
Mitchell (2009) nd that scope economies are positively associated with a
greater propensity to vertically integrate complementary activities rather than
concurrently source them.
With respect to the latter issue, i.e. outsourcing and the structural compo-
sition of the local system, the little empirical literature available is primarily
based on the subcontracting decisions taken by US rms with respect to white-
collar business services. The basic theoretical framework dates back to Stigler
(1951), who claims that a higher concentration of industry may induce rms to
vertically disintegrate production, so to obtain cheaper inputs from specialised
suppliers.
In this respect, Holmes (1999), for instance, looking at Census data on US
manufacturing plants in 1987, nds that the intensity of input purchase by
a plant is positively correlated with the level of employment of neighbouring
plants in the same industry. In this case, a positive relationship arises between
outsourcing and industrial specialisation, whereas a null or even negative cor-
relation seems to emerge with respect to the employment level in neighbours
operating in related industries. Finally, a mixed evidence characterises the
relationship between vertical disintegration and urbanisation: positive up to a
7certain level of population density, and negative afterwards.
Similar results are also contained in Ono (2001, 2006). Using data from the
1992 Annual Survey on Manufacturers, she nds that, once controlled for rm
characteristics, a nal producer is more likely to outsource when it is located in
thick markets, as measured by the level of employment in metropolitan areas.
This eect derives from an increase in the local demand for outsourcing, which,
in turn, increases the localisation of specialised suppliers, thus decreasing the
price of the service. A lower price, then, will increase the potential benets
for the manufacturing rm, thus increasing its likelihood to outsource. In
particular, she nds that a doubling of U.S. local demand for white collar
services increases the probability to outsource by an amount between 7 and
25%.
With respect to the Italian case, few papers have focused on outsourcing
and the industrial composition of the local system of production. Relying on
a cross-sectional sample of 166 manufacturing rms located in the Province
of Reggio Emilia (Italy), Mazzanti, Montresor, and Pini (2007b) nd that the
outsourcing decisions of geographically embedded rms are weakly related to
traditional TCE aspects, but, on the contrary, they are related to the organ-
isational structure of the rm and to the quality of industrial relations which
characterise the local system of production. In particular, they nd that a
higher propensity to outsource production is negatively linked to union den-
sity, the belonging to a business group and a more hierarchical governance
organisation, and positively related to unions involvement in the outsourcing
decision process as well as a more divisional organisation of production.
Finally, looking at Italian manufacturing rms over the period 1998-2003,
Antonietti and Cainelli (2008) nd that the outsourcing of knowledge-intensive
business services is particularly driven by ICT usage and by the interplay
between rms R&D intensity and their location within a dense local production
system. This nding allows them to stress the role of geographic proximity,
knowledge spillovers and closer interaction among agents in simplifying the
management of complex transactions and in increasing rms competitiveness
even in the face of increasing globalisation of production.
In the present work, we extend the analysis and we look at the role of
spatial agglomeration variables, as measured by the level of specialisation,
variety and urbanisation of a LLS (Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer,
1992; Henderson, Kuncoro, and Turner, 1995; Ciccone and Hall, 1996) as the
main sources of local knowledge spillovers.
Since Marshall, agglomeration economies have been seen as a type of exter-
nalities which aects rms for the fact of being located one closed to the other,
so that a continuous exchange of knowledge 
ows may help them reaching high
productivity growth, lower unemployment and higher propensity to innovation
8(Frenken, van Oort, and Verburg, 2007). In particular, dierent sources of lo-
cal spillovers may arise from spatial agglomeration: (i) external economies
coming from the geographical proximity of rms operating within the same
industry (localisation economies); (ii) external economies available to all rms
irrespective of industry and arising from urbanisation and a high density of
dierent types of activities within a certain area (urbanisation economies).2
The evolutionary economics literature has recently gone beyond the tradi-
tional distinction between localisation economies and Jacobs' externalities by
introducing the concept of related variety (Boschma, 2004; Frenken, van Oort,
and Verburg, 2007; Boschma and Iammarino, 2009; Asheim, Boschma, and
Cooke, 2009), as a key source of regional branching and growth deriving from
knowledge spillovers across complementary sectors. According to Frenken, van
Oort, and Verburg (2007), the degree of related variety of a region can be iden-
tied by looking at 5-digit sectors which share the same 2-digit sector of the
same type.
Given this, we expect that full and concurrent sourcing can be signicantly
related to spatial agglomeration variables, and, in particular, to an industrial
composition characterised by a high degree of related variety. On the one hand,
the increasing complexity and modularisation of products may induce manu-
facturing rms to increase the local demand for a wide variety of supplying
services, thus attracting rms of dierent types and increasing the variety of
the knowledge base of the region. On the other hand, the spatial concentration
of a wide variety of suppliers that specialise on dierent stages of the produc-
tion process may induce rms to fragment the value chain and subcontract the
activities in which it lacks expertise.
3 Data and variables description
3.1 The dataset
Data come from the so{called Studi di Settore (Sector Studies), introduced in
1993 and developed by the Italian Fiscal Authority (Agenzia delle Entrate)
with the aim of establishing a benchmark of relevant information on rms for
scal purposes. Therefore, the primary scope of these Studies is to systemat-
ically collect information on the main activities of Italian small and medium
rms and the economic context in which they operate, in order to evaluate the
proper capacity of those rms to create income and to avoid the possibility of
tax evasion.
2For an empirical analysis of the Italian case, see Cainelli and Leoncini (1999).
9Our data concern only the 'mechanical' sector (ATECO 1991 2-digit code 29
'Manufacture of machinery and equipment not elsewhere classied'). For each
observation, a detailed set of information is available both on the type of pro-
duction activities and on the way these activities are operated. Of particular
interest is the possibility to identify which phases characterise the production
process of each rm and which of them are developed internally, externally or
through concurrent sourcing.
In building our nal sample, we started from a set of about 4,500 rms
located in Emilia Romagna region in year 2005. While the Sector Studies
focus on business units with less than 100 employees (more precisely, with
an annual turnover less than 5,164,169), we cleaned those observations with
missing values in the dependent or in the explanatory variables, and with
inconsistencies. Moreover we refer to rms with less than 50 employee as after
this threshold the universe of rms is substantially not covered. We obtain
a nal sample of 3,289 rms. In Table 1 we compare the employment size
composition of our sample with ocial 2001 Census data provided by the
Italian Statistical Oce (ISTAT, 2001).
Table 1: Frequency distribution of rms by class of employees
class of employees Census 2001 % Sector Studies %
1   9 4,560 75.4 2328 70.8
10-15 638 10.5 412 12.5
16-19 252 4.2 194 5.9
20-49 599 9.9 355 10.8
total 6,049 100 3,289 100
As stated before, our data concern rms operating in the mechanical in-
dustry that compiled the Sector Study questionnaire in year 2005. Over the
last ve decades, this sector has shown particularly high growth rates, both
in terms of productivity and in terms of employment, so that now it can
be considered as one of the leading industries in Italy. The areas of highest
employment concentration are mainly in the North of Italy, particularly in
regions like Piedmont, Lombardy, Emilia Romagna and Veneto (ISTAT, 2001;
Russo, Pirani, and Paterlini, 2006). When disaggregating the Italian terri-
tory by Local Labour Systems (LLS) (ISTAT, 2001),3 we see that the largest
mechanical rms are mainly concentrated in the areas of Milan and Turin,
whereas the small and medium sized rms are located around the Provinces
of Bologna (Emilia Romagna, with more than 60,000 employees), Bergamo
3A Local Labour System is dened as a geographical area grouping dierent neighbouring
Municipalities and identied on the base of daily commuting.
10and Brescia (Lombardy, around 59,000 and 40,000 employees respectively),
Lecco (Lombardy, 35,000 employees), Padua (Veneto, around 35,000 employ-
ees) and Modena (Emilia Romagna, around 26,000 employees) (Russo, Pirani,
and Paterlini, 2006).
In Emilia Romagna, the bulk of small and medium mechanical rms lies
primarily along a central line running from the Province of Rimini in the
South East part of the region to the Province of Piacenza in the North West
(the so{called via Emilia) and involving primarily the cities of Bologna, Imola
and Modena, and, secondly, the LLS of Cento (Ferrara), Guastalla (Reggio
Emilia) and Porretta (Bologna). Next to this, a cluster of LLS with dierent
manufacturing specialisations includes the cities of Correggio (Reggio Emilia),
Sassuolo, Carpi, Mirandola (Modena) and the Province of Parma in the North-
West and the Provinces of Ravenna, Forl-Cesena and Ferrara in the South-
East. A cluster of manufacturing LLS nally includes the cities of Copparo
and Comacchio and is linked with the manufacturing belt of rms in the South
of Veneto region.
Within the 2-digit mechanical industry, the main specialisation concern the
production of machinery for the following sectors: robotics (Piacenza), food
(Parma), agriculture, motor vehicles and oleo dynamics (Reggio Emilia), motor
vehicles, automobile, food packaging and electro-medical equipment (Bologna),
ceramics (Sassuolo), wood (from Carpi to Rimini), shipbuilding (from Ravenna
to Rimini) among the others. The high presence of small and medium sized
rms is primarily due to the technology of the mechanical production process,
the decomposability of which allows a high division of labour and a high spe-
cialisation of rms on single stages of the value chain. The high fragmentation
of the production process and a high degree of specialisation mainly contribute
to the eciency of these rms in the presence of strong network relationships
and a strong degree of complementarity (Russo and Bigarelli, 2009).
With respect to this last aspect, rms operating in the mechanical districts
of Emilia Romagna can be classied into two typologies: nal rms (conto
proprio) and subcontracting rms (conto terzi). While the former are rms
producing goods on their own, the latter are rms producing on behalf of
other rms. Final rms realise nal goods in small series, are larger and
oriented to national and international markets; subcontracting rms, instead,
are generally smaller, more specialised on the production of components and
focused on serving mainly the local demand by nal rms.
Interestingly, the outsourcing of production activities may also involve sub-
contracting rms. However, while nal rms tend to fully outsource the pro-
duction of components, up to including the purchase of the inputs, subcon-
tracting rms tend to jointly source their activities to even more specialised
suppliers (Russo and Bigarelli, 2009).
11Moreover, in our data we can identify around thirty dierent activities
characterising the mechanical production process, and in particular the trans-
formation stages of raw materials and ideas into nite goods, i.e. from the
phase of design to the phase of nal assembly. For convenience, we group all
these phases into eight categories: project and design (phase 1), treatments
of mechanical parts, including sintering, heat and cold treatments and surface
treatments (phase 2), assembly of mechanical parts (phase 3), the development
of software programs for quality control (phase 4), treatment of non mechani-
cal parts as rubber and plastic, glass and wood (phase 5), checking and testing
(phase 6), nishing, which includes packing, spraying, sand-blasting and wash-
ing (phase 7), installing/repairing and maintenance (phase 8).
We reasonably consider Design to be the most knowledge-intensive phase,
as it involves projecting and the creation of new ideas. Phases 2 and 3, instead,
group the 'core' activities of a mechanical rm, namely those involving the
manufacturing of mechanical components. Phase 4, instead, can be considered
as a 'transversal' phase, since not all rms develop a quality control system
and because such a control may involve horizontally more than one stage of
the manufacturing process. On this purpose, together with phase 5, 6 and 8,
it can be dened as an 'ancillary' phase. Phases from 5 to 8, represent also
the downstream stages of the production process, whereas phases from 1 to 3
constitute the upstream and central ones.
Table 2 shows the distribution of each group of phases with respect to
the decision of rms to operate them fully in-house, through full outsourcing,
and through concurrent sourcing. From the Table it is easy to see that, while
phases 3 and 8 are the mostly operated, phases 1, 4 and 5 are the less present.
Moreover rms tend to operate phases 3, 6 and 8 mainly in-house, while phase 2
and 4 are the most outsourced and phases 2, 3 and 8 are the most concurrently
sourced. It is also interesting to note that, except for phases 4 and 5, the
number of rms which choose to concurrently source production is higher than
the number of rms choosing to fully outsource production. In addition, when
looking only at the most present phases (i.e. 3 and 8), full outsourcing is never
the dominant choice among rms. Concurrent sourcing, instead, dominates in
phases 2 and 7.
3.2 The variables
In the empirical analysis, we are interested in identifying the sign and the
relevance of the relationship between the choice to make and/or buy and three
main sets of variables: one concerning some rm-specic characteristics, one
related to the composition and complexity of the production process and one
related to spatial agglomeration economies.
12Table 2: Distribution of production phases
Phase carried out: only only both not Total
internally externally present
1 { Design freq. 889 154 235 2011 3289
% 27,0 4,7 7,1 61,1 100
% 69,6 12,1 18,4 100
2 { Manufacturing of freq. 437 445 1010 1397 3289
mechanical parts % 13,3 13,5 30,7 42,5 100
% 23,1 23,5 53,4 100
3 { Assembling freq. 1159 206 1132 792 3289
% 35,2 6,3 34,4 24,1 100
% 46,4 8,2 45,3 100
4 { Software freq. 196 398 104 2591 3289
development % 6,0 12,1 3,2 78,8 100
% 28,1 57,0 14,9 100
5 { Manufacturing of freq. 114 236 58 2881 3289
non-mechanical parts % 3,5 7,2 1,8 87,6 100
% 27,9 57,8 14,2 100
6 { Testing freq. 1570 127 160 1432 3289
% 47,7 3,9 4,9 43,5 100
% 84,5 6,8 8,6 100
7 { Finishing freq. 603 340 806 1540 3289
% 18,3 10,3 24,5 46,8 100
% 34,5 19,4 46,1 100
8 { Installing, repairing freq. 1541 165 944 639 3289
maintenance % 46,9 5,0 28,7 19,4 100
% 58,2 6,2 35,6 100
Among rm characteristics we include: (i) size, as captured by two em-
ployment dummies for small (11-20) and small-medium rms (21-50); (ii) age
at year 2005; (iii) skill intensity of the workforce, as measured by the share
of white collars (managers, executives and administrative); (iv) labour cost
per employee; (v) the market in which the rm operates, and in particular
if the rm is active on foreign markets, either in the European Union or out-
side. This last variable aims at capturing the degree of market competitiveness
and uncertainty surrounding the rm, under the reasonable assumption that
rms operating only on national, or even local, markets face a lower number
of competitors and are less subject to international 
uctuations of demand.
We then capture the complexity of the production process by looking both
13at the input and at the output side. From the input side, we include eight
dummies grouping the main phases that each rm declared to be included in
the production process: these dummies are equal to 1 if a rm operates at
least one activity contained in each of the eight groups, independently on the
decision to operate it in-house or externally. From the output side, we include
a variable measuring the number of products oered by each rm: the higher
the value of this variable the wider the range of products oered and, thus,
the higher the level of product complexity (Ono and Stango, 2005). A higher
value of such a variable can also be interpreted in terms of potential scope
economies, namely the capacity of the rm to save on production costs when
jointly producing two or more goods.
In line with previous empirical literature, the variables referring to spa-
tial agglomeration economies are given by: (i) the localisation index Lik =
lik=lk
lir=lr, where lik represents the number of employees in the i-th sector (3-digit
ATECO) and in the k-th LLS, lir is the number of employees in i-th sec-
tor at the regional level, and lk =
P
i lik and lr =
P
i lir)4; (ii) the related
variety index obtained as 1=Hik, being Hik the Herndahl index dened as:
Hik =
P
h(lhik=lik)2 where lhik is the number of employees of the h-th rm in
the i-th sector located in the k-th LLS5; (iii) the density index Dik =
lik=supk
lir=supr,
in which supk represents the area (in squared metres) of the k-th LLS and
supr represents the area of the Emilia Romagna region.
4 Methodology
4.1 Modelling count data
To investigate the outsourcing decision, we estimate which factors among the
ones selected, and to what extent, are associated with the intensity of the
outsourcing decision, as measured by the number of activities contracted out
by the rm with respect to the total number of phases performed by the rm..
Since our dependent variable measures a discrete number of non-negative
events, and it has an asymmetric distribution, we use a Poisson model (Cameron
and Trivedi, 1998; Winkelmann, 2003) dened by the probability distribution:
4If the index is higher than 1 it implies that the region is specialised in the sector under
examination (Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer, 1992)
5As far as the index is computed, an increase in the degree of (related) diversication
around the rm is re
ected by an increase of the ratio 1/H (Henderson, Kuncoro, and
Turner, 1995). Note that, since we have only one sector at the 2-digit level, we take the
3-digit level as the base reference for computing our variety measure; this measure is slightly
dierent from the original indicator of related variety developed by Frenken, van Oort, and
Verburg (2007), but is in line with the neighbour related index developed by Holmes (1999).
14Pr[Y = yi] =
yiexp( )
yi! ; yi = 0;1;2;:::, with E(y) = V (y) = ;   0.
The intensity (or rate) parameter (i) represents both mean and variance.
4.1.1 Poisson and negative binomial regression models to model
counts or proportions of counts
In the Poisson regression model (P) the mean  is modelled as a function
of covariates. Given n independent observations (yi;xi) where yi denotes the
number of occurrences of the event of interest, and xi is the vector of regressors,
a Poisson regression model is derived from the Poisson distribution by allowing







; yi = 0;1;2;:::
with the logarithm of the systematic component modelled as a linear function
of the covariates: E(yijxi) = i = exp(x0
i) or equivalently ln(i) = xT
i  that
ensures i  0.
Such a relationship ensures the positiveness of the dependent variable, no
matter what are the values taken by the explanatory variables. Considering
that E(yijxi) = V (yijxi) = i, the regression is intrinsically heteroskedastic.
The method of maximum likelihood (iterative methods) is used to estimate
the parameter.6
If it is more suitable to analyse the `event count' in the form of proportions
or ratios of counts (incidence of an event), where count are divided by some










i or, equivalently, ln(i) = ln(ti) + x0
i. The
quantity ln(ti) | dened as oset | has a coecient equal to 1, and is used
to standardise counts from populations of dierent sizes.
If the estimate of dispersion after tting, as measured by the deviance or
Pearson's chi-square, divided by the degrees of freedom, is not near 1, then
the data may be over{dispersed, that is V (yijxi) > E(yijxi). In this case,
alternative models may provide a better t. When the model for the mean
is correct but the true distribution is not Poisson, the maximum likelihood
estimates of the model parameters are still consistent, but the standard errors
6Problems related to simple OLS estimation method are the following: it ignores the
restricted support for the outcome variables to non{negative values (prediction could be
negatives); it relies on the assumption that the outcome variable is continuous; it assumes
a symmetric Normal distribution of residuals (whereas Poisson distribution is skewed, and
highly skewed for small mean values); it is based on the homoskedasticity assumption.
15are incorrect. In fact, over{dispersion leads to underestimates of the standard
errors and overestimates of the chi-square statistics.
A simple way to account for over{dispersion is to introduce in the model
a more 
exible distribution with respect to the Poisson one that permits the
variance to exceed the mean, as the negative binomial distribution. This distri-
bution is a conjugate mixture distribution for count data and a generalisation
of the Poisson distribution. The negative binomial distribution assumes that
the conditional distribution of the response variable is Poisson, but the mean
parameter for the subjects follows a gamma distribution (Agresti, 2002). It
follows that the gamma mixture of Poisson distributions yields a marginal
distribution for the response variable, that is negative binomial.
A functional form generally used for modelling over{dispersion is expressed
as V (yijxi) = i + k2
i, where k > 0 is a scalar and  is the dispersion
parameter. This assumption leads to the Negative Binomial model that is
dened by two parameters, one of which allows for dierent mean and variance,
while the Poisson model is characterised by one parameter (the NB2 model,
as in Cameron and Trivedi (1998)).





(1 + ki)yi+k 1 k  0 yi = 0;1;2;:::
that reduces to the Poisson distribution if k = 0. The Negative Binomial re-
gression model is then obtained assuming the mentioned variance function and
maintaining the assumption on the expected value E(yijxi) = i = exp(x0
i).
4.1.2 Excess of zeros
When data are characterised by an excess of zero observations { in the sense
that the observed distribution exhibits a large number of zeros with respect
to that which would be expected in standard Poisson or Negative Binomial {
two main alternative solutions have been proposed in the literature: (i) the
zero-in
ated model leading to the Zero-In
ated Poisson (ZIP) regression or the
Zero-In
ated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regression; (ii) the hurdle regression
model leading to the Hurdle Poisson (HP) regression or to the Hurdle Negative
Binomial (HNB) regression.
In this framework the data generating process operates in a dual regime:
the rst in which the count moves from zero to some discrete event-count
distribution and the second that generates the observed count (for a review
see Cameron and Trivedi (1998)).
In the zero-in
ated Poisson and Negative Binomial regression models we
have that yi = 0 with probability 'i and yi  Poisson(i) with probability
16(1   'i). The model is then:
Pr[yi = 0] = 'i + (1   'i)e
 i:
Pr[yi = r] = (1   'i)e
 i
r
i=r! r = 1;2;:::
In this data-generating process we have two sources of zeros: zeros may
come from both the point mass and from the count component. This distribu-
tion can be interpreted as a nite mixture of a degenerate distribution, whose
mass is concentrated at zero, and of a Poisson distribution.
In the Zero-In
ated Poisson (ZIP) regression model, the probability 'i can








The ZIP model can be extended to the negative binomial case leading to the
Zero-In
ated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regression models.
The basic idea behind the Hurdle Poisson and Negative binomial regression
models is that a binomial probability governs the binary outcome of whether a
count variate has a zero or a positive realisation. If the realisation is positive,
\the hurdle is crossed" and the conditional distribution of the positives is
governed by a truncated-at-zero count data model.
The hurdle specication in the Poisson case is that yi = 0 with probability
'i and yi  truncated Poisson(i) with probability (1   'i). The Hurdle
Poisson (HP) regression model is dened as follows:
Pr[yi = 0] = 'i




 i)] r = 1;2;:::
where, as for the ZIP model, 'i and i can be modelled by logit and log-linear
functions, respectively.
A hurdle version of the Negative Binomial regression model can be obtained
by substituting the truncated Negative Binomial distribution to the to the
truncated Poisson one, this leading to the Hurdle Negative Binomial (HNB)
regression model.
The dierence between hurdle models and zero-in
ated models are is that
the hurdle model keeps the zero-class separate from the non-zero class while
the zero-in
ated model has two sources of zeros, as they may come from both
the point mass and from the count component.
The choice between the two models should depend on whether or not the
zeros are truly distinct from non-zeros between the two parameters. However
often the two models produce very similar results and, in absence of strong
17considerations in favour of one over the other, the choice can be based largely
on reasons of convenience.
In order to select the best{t model a test can be used: if the compared
models are nested, a LR test is to be performed, while if they are non{nested,
a Vuong test is preferred.
5 Empirical estimation
Since we aim at modelling the intensity of outsourcing we use the total number
of phases performed by the rm as oset. The proportion of zeros is about the
35% for the rst variable (1159 on 3289 obs.) and the 46% for the second one
(1529 on 3289 obs.), whereas under Poisson assumptions we would expect 3289
exp( 1:25) = 942 zeros in partially outsourced and 3289 exp( 2:47) = 278
zeros in totally outsourced, thus conrming the choice of a model dealing with
an excess of zeros.
5.1 Model choice
As said before, two models are eligible for the empirical analysis, the zero
in
ated and the hurdle one. The aim here is to select the best model between
those estimated. At rst, to test the need of the hurdle or of the zero-in
ation
components we have to compare that models to the basic Poisson or Negative
Binomial. Secondly we compare the hurdle formulation with the zero-in
ated
one. As a large part of these comparisons contains non nested models, we use
the Vuong test, the results of which lead to select the Zero In
ated Negative
Binomial model for both totally (Table 3) and partially (Table 4) outsourced
phases of production.
For each of the two dierent modalities of outsourcing (total and partial)
we therefore estimated a Zero In
ated Negative binomial (ZINB). It must be
noted that, in interpreting the results, in the in zero in
ated models, the zero
in
ation component predicts the probability of observing a zero count from the
point mass component (whereas, for instance, in the hurdle negative binomial,
the zero hurdle component describes the probability of observing a positive
counts).
An important caveat must be put forward in interpreting the results. Due
to the cross-sectional nature of our data, and since we observe only one year,
we must be aware that our ndings do not imply a clear relation of causality
among the variables. Rather, we should interpret them in terms of association
among outcome variable and covariates.
18Table 3: Model choice statistics for totally outsourced phases of production
Preferred
models Z=2 value p-value model
P { ZIP -11,6 0 0,000 ZIP
NB { ZINB -11,13 0,000 ZINB
ZIP { ZINB (nested) 209,95 0,000 ZINB
P { HP -10,70 0,000 HP
NB { HNB -9,12 0,000 HNB
HP { HNB (nested) 201,10 0,000 HNB
ZINB { HNB 5,47 0,000 ZINB
Vuong test are used to compare non-nested models (Z statistic)
LR test are used to compare nested models (2 statistics)
Table 4: Model choice for partially outsourced phases of production
Preferred
models Z=2 value p-value model
P { ZIP -15,21 0,000 ZIP
NB { ZINB -10,42 0,000 ZINB
ZIP { ZINB (nested) 202,44 0,000 ZINB
P { HP -14,86 0,000 HP
NB { HNB -8,91 0,002 HNB
HP { HNB (nested) 200,67 0,000 HNB
ZINB { HNB 1,95 0,250 ZINB
Vuong test are used to compare non-nested models (Z statistics)
LR test are used to compare nested models (2 statistic)
5.2 Estimation results
The estimated selected model shows a very good t for both total (see Figure
1) and partial (Figure 2) outsourcing. In the following discussion we rely on
the model choice statistics (see Table 3 and 4) and we present the results
pertaining to the ZINB estimates; however, in the Appendix we also present
the results obtained through the HNB model as a robustness check.
In the following Tables from 5 to 8 showing the estimated models, are split
into two parts. The results on the \yes/no" choice (the \no" choice corre-
sponding to zero phases outsourced) are shown in the rst two columns, while
the second two columns show the results about the intensity with which the
outsourcing strategy has been implemented (i.e. the \how many" choice) once
the decision to outsource has been taken. Therefore, we show the regression
19Figure 1: Fully outsourced phases: expected vs. observed frequency distribu-
tion
results for the propensity to outsource and the intensity of outsourcing, this
latter measured by the number of production activities that the rm actually
contracted out in 2005.
Note that for each estimated model the dispersion parameter(log(theta))
is signicantly dierent from zero. This suggests that the outcome variable is
over-dispersed and that a Negative Binomial model is more appropriated than
a Poisson model.
With respect to the total outsourcing, we nd that the probability to full
outsource production is positively associated with the presence of the rm
on international markets and with unit labour cost, whereas is is negatively
associated (although the coecient is not very signicant) with our measure of
localisation economies and with the number of products delivered. In a sense,
having international customers, and thus facing a higher level of competition,
may induce the rm to devote more resources to its 'core' activities, thus
subcontracting the redundant stages of production or relying on the expertise
provided by specialised suppliers in order to deliver a high-quality product.
The expected positive association with unit labour costs, instead, conrms
that rms use outsourcing mainly as a cost-saving strategy.
When looking at the composition of the transformation process, we nd
a positive relationship between the propensity to outsource and the potential
20Figure 2: Concurrently sourced phases: expected vs. observed frequency dis-
tribution
operation of phases 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7, whereas coecients of phase 8 is negative.
First of all, the structure of the production process in
uences the decision to
make-or-buy. Second, being a rm which operates skill-intensive (design and
software development) and core mechanical activities (processing of mechanical
components) increases the propensity to subcontract other non-core activities.
The negative coecient for phase 8, instead, may be interpreted as capturing
the answer of possible 'service' rms (e.g. Russo and Bigarelli, 2009), namely
rms which provide installing and repairing services and that, for this reason,
are mainly suppliers.
With respect to the intensity of outsourcing, we nd a signicant and
positive association with the workforce skill level, with the presence of the rm
on international markets, and with our measure of related variety, while the
association turns to be negative with rm size, age and unit labour cost. Hence,
once controlled for the qualitative composition of the production process, we
nd that the most outsourcing intensive rms are relatively small, young, and
technologically advanced, as shown by the skill intensity of their workforce and
by their presence on foreign markets.
Interestingly, while spatial agglomeration variables do not seem to aect - or
to be aected by - the subcontracting choice of rms, they turn to be signicant
with respect to the intensity of outsourcing. In particular, as we expected, the
higher the share of stages contracted out, the higher the possibility to attract
21dierent types of suppliers, thus increasing the degree of related variety of the
LLS. Alternatively, a higher related variety, i.e. a higher presence of rms
operating in related 3-digit sectors, may be the base for a higher probability
to match specialised suppliers over dierent stages of the production process.
Table 5: Number of phases of the productive process totally outsourced
Zero-in
ation model coe. Count model coe.
Zero-in
ation model (binomial with logit link) (negbin with log link)
Estimate Estimate
Intercept 1,439 *** -0,881 ***
11-20 empl. -0,181 -0,164 ***
21-50 empl. -0,253 -0,230 ***
Age -0,009 -0,009 ***
Share of white collars -0,218 0,555 ***
UE & extraUE mkt -0,505 ** 0,086 *
Num. products 0,075 + 0,002
Labour cost per empl. -2,235 * -0,932 ***
Localisation 0,089 + 0,005
Variety -0,072 0,056 **
Density -0,023 0,008
1 - Design -0,893 *** -0,044
2 - Mech. parts processing -1,109 *** 0,165 **
3 - Assembly -0,173 -0,085
4 - Software development -0,844 *** 0,173 ***
5 - Non{mech. parts proc. -0,335 0,158 ***
6 - Testing -0,367 * 0,023
7 - Finishing -1,086 *** -0,048
8 - Installing, rep., maint. 0,439 * -0,153 ***
Log(theta) 1,953 ***
Log lik = -5056 (df = 39)
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1
Table 6 presents the econometric results for the choice to concurrently
source. In this case, the picture seems to be simpler. In particular, we nd
a strong positive association only with rm's age, size and labour cost per
employee, while the relationship with our density variable is positive but weak.
In addition, we nd only one phase to be linked with such a strategic decision,
namely the core activity 2.
The intensity, in turn, seems to conrm this pattern as there is a positive
association with rm size and product diversity, whereas a negative association
emerges with phases 2 , 7 and 8. Surprisingly, spatial agglomeration economies
again are not related with concurrent sourcing. What aects the industrial
22composition of the local context, then, is not the decision to outsource per
s e, but, rather, the number of phases fully outsourced to specialised suppliers.
These latter, in turn, may also decide to further sub-contract production, thus
attracting other specialised suppliers.
Table 6: Number of phases of the productive process partially outsourced
Zero-in
ation model coe. Count model coe.
Zero-in
ation model (binomial with logit link) (negbin with log link)
Estimate Estimate
Intercept 1,656 *** -1,164 ***
11-20 empl. -0,397 * 0,183 **
21-50 empl. -0,465 + 0,308 ***
Age -0,020 *** -0,003
Share of white collars -0,313 0,113
UE & extraUE mkt -0,226 0,072
Num. products -0,011 0,048 **
Labour cost per empl. -3,666 *** -0,274
Localisation 0,015 -0,016
Variety 0,090 -0,006
Density -0,102 + 0,004
1 - Design -0,238 -0,097
2 - Mech. parts processing -0,740 *** -0,364 ***
3 - Assembly -0,142 -0,049
4 - Software development -0,017 0,111 +
5 - Non{mech. parts proc. -0,108 0,008
6 - Testing -0,203 -0,086
7 - Finishing -0,199 -0,337 ***
8 - Installing, rep., maint. 0,311 0,256 **
Log(theta) 1,174 ***
Log lik = -4124 (df = 39)
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1
5.3 Final vs. subcontracting rms
We now separately consider nal rms (conto proprio) and subcontracting
rms (conto terzi). The former are rms producing goods on their own, while
the latter are rms producing on behalf of other rms. We dene a rm
as 'nal' (subcontracting) if it declares to operated at least the 90% of its
activities in-house (externally).7 Our results show full outsourcing decisions
7Our results do not change if we set the volume of activities at 80% and 70%. The
estimates are not reported here, but are available on request.
23by both nal (Table 7) and subcontracting rms (Table 8).
Table 7: Number of phases of the productive process fully outsourced by nal
rms (n=725)
Zero-in
ation model coe. Count model coe.
Zero-in
ation model (binomial with logit link) (negbin with log link)
Estimate Estimate
Intercept -0,006 -1,315 ***
11-20 empl. -0,717 -0,142 *
21-50 empl. 0,724 -0,249 **
Age 0,071 ** -0,007 **
Share of white collars 5,009 + 0,590 **
UE & extraUE mkt -0,902 -0,059
Num. products -1,376 -0,001
Labour cost per empl. -1,347 -0,942 ***
Localisation -0,196 0,000
Variety -0,858 * 0,052 .
Density -0,041 0,012
1 - Design 0,079 -0,037
2 - Mech. parts processing 0,402 0,612 ***
3 - Assembly 1,219 -0,253
4 - Software development -4,234 0,123 *
5 - Non{mech. parts proc. -0,645 0,178 **
6 - Testing -1,274 0,035
7 - Finishing -1,995 ** 0,248 *
8 - Installing, rep., maint. 0,184 -0,171 *
Log(theta) 2,221 ***
Log lik = -1484 (df = 39)
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1
Regarding the choice of recurring to outsourcing, our results show marked
dierences between nal and subcontracting rms. In the former case, while
the outsourcing choice is signicantly related only to the age of the rm (-)
and our measure of related variety (+) (once controlled for the presence of the
eight phases of product transformation), the intensity of outsourcing shows
a negative association with rm size, age, unit labour cost, and a positive
association with the skill intensity of the workforce as well as related variety
(at 10% level).
Once accounting for the phases characterising their production process,
subcontracting rms, instead, relate their outsourcing decision positively on
age, their commitment on foreign markets and unit labour cost, while nega-
tively with a more specialised industrial composition of the LLS. Once decided,
24the number of activities contracted out is negatively related to the age of the
rm as well as labour cost per employee and positively to workforce skills.
Factors aecting the outsourcing strategies, therefore, seem to be slightly
dierent between nal and subcontracting rms. The main dierences seem to
emerge with respect to variables of size, age, labour cost and spatial agglom-
eration. In particular, the size of the rm is related only with the intensity
of outsourcing by nal rms, while the sign of the estimated coecient of the
age variable shows that outsourcing involves primarily younger nal rms and
older subcontracting rms. While the sign of labour cost coecient is negative
in both cases, its magnitude reveals that its importance in aecting - or in be-
ing aected by - outsourcing is much higher in the case of subcontracting rms.
The relationship with spatial agglomeration variables, instead, is less clear: the
signicance of the three estimated coecients is generally low, and only variety
seems to be related with the decision to outsource by nal rms. This means
that the positive eect previously identied emerges only when we consider
all the dierent types of rms operating on the regional territory. Finally, the
make and/or buy strategy seems to involve dierent phases of product trans-
formation: 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 for nal rms, being phase 5 the most signicant,
and 1, 2, 4 and 7 for subcontracting rms. This result, again, reveals that
what rms actually do matters and that subcontracting rms outsource when
they are involved in the polar phases of production, i.e. design and nishing,
whereas nal rms outsource when they operate the middle stages.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper represents a rst exploration of the factors related to the rm
decision to fully or partially outsource production activities. To our knowledge,
this paper is the rst and only attempt to use detailed rm-level data from
the Italian Fiscal Authority in order to analyse such a kind of issues.
Our analysis is concerned with the identication of the key variables that
aect the decision to make and/or buy by a set of mechanical rms located
in Emilia Romagna (Italy). We improve the existing literature by adding
variables capturing local externalities and variables measuring the type of ac-
tivities operated by each plant. Due to the cross-sectional nature of our data,
however, we are not able to clearly identify causal relationships between out-
sourcing and the other variables so that further research in this direction is
needed.
The technology and composition of the production process is, for this pur-
pose, a crucial aspect that, probably due to the lack of detailed data, has been
often neglected in the literature. We tried to ll this gap by rst including
25Table 8: Number of phases of the productive process fully outsourced by sub-
contracting rms (n=924)
Zero-in
ation model coe. Count model coe.
Zero-in
ation model (binomial with logit link) (negbin with log link)
Estimate Estimate
Intercept 1,908 *** -0,710 ***
11-20 empl. -0,571 -0,087
21-50 empl. -0,214 -0,009
Age -0,045 ** -0,016 ***
Share of white collars 1,857 0,677 **
UE & extraUE mkt -0,744 * 0,091
Num. products 0,032 0,022
Labour cost per empl. -4,071 * -1,396 ***
Localisation 0,166 + 0,090
Variety -0,176 0,016
Density -0,041 -0,020
1 - Design -1,139 ** -0,236 **
2 - Mech. parts processing -0,769 ** 0,484
3 - Assembly 0,100 0,074
4 - Software development -0,431 0,172 *
5 - Non{mech. parts proc. -0,303 0,057
6 - Testing -0,227 0,162 .
7 - Finishing -0,814 ** -0,198 *
8 - Installing, rep., maint. 0,209 0,020
Log(theta) 2,143 ***
Log lik = -1225 (df = 39)
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1
the stages actually operated by the rm as covariates in our rm-level esti-
mates, and, second, by analysing the two dierent sets of rms constituting
our sample in nal and outsourcing rms.
We have thus shown the results of zero-in
ated negative binomial models
in which we use the probability to fully outsource, the probability to partially
outsource and the intensity of both of them as dependent variables. Our esti-
mates seem to show that production activities, human capital composition and
spatial agglomeration are important factors related to both the propensity and
the intensity of outsourcing. However, marked dierences seem to characterise
the patterns with which full and partial outsourcing are carried out by the
rms.
Indeed, it seems that, once controlled for the phase-composition of the
production process, the choice to fully outsource is directly related to the
26exporting activity of rms and to their labour costs. The positioning on in-
ternational markets and the need to cut on labour costs can be interpreted as
a 'search{for{eciency' strategy in the production of high-quality products.
On this purpose, the signicance of the estimated coecients concerning the
most skill-intensive and core activities (as design, the processing of mechanical
parts and software development) seems to conrm our interpretation. Once
the decision is taken, however, outsourcing seems to be related to a smaller
size, a smaller age, a higher skill intensity, a lower average cost of labour and,
more interestingly, a higher degree of related variety. Due to the nature of
our data, this last result can be explained in two ways. On the one hand, the
availability of local rms specialised on complementary stages of the produc-
tion process may induce rms to rely more on outsourcing, due to lower prices
as well as a higher level of trust and social interactions among the agents. On
the other hand, a higher volume of activities outsourced - both in quantitative
and qualitative terms - may modify the local production context by attract-
ing a diversied range of suppliers, thus increasing the employment in related
sectors. Finally, we distinguish between nal and subcontracting rms and
we nd that their outsourcing strategies are related to dierent variables. In
particular, nal rms committed to outsourcing seem to be older and larger
and relatively less based on labour cost saving objectives.
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